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The Mediatization of War: A Comparison of the American and German Media Coverage of the Vietnam and Iraq Wars¹

By Gerd Horten

The last fifty years have seen the further expansion of the role of media during times of war. Although no longer dominated by large-scale propaganda agencies as during the two world wars, the media nevertheless have become ever more integral to the planning and conduct of wars. This article applies the concept of mediatization in an attempt to capture the ever increasing role of the media during war times as part of an ongoing and accelerating historical process. It uses a comparative analysis to highlight the commonalities of this process as well as to emphasize national particularities. The article argues that the mediatization of war has significantly accelerated over the past fifty years and has established the media as the “fourth branch” of military operations, which is just as essential as the army, navy and air force.

Introduction

A new concept has emerged over the past decade in the discussion of the media's impact on politics, society, and culture: mediatization. Mediatization research tries to analyze the dynamics of our increasingly media-saturated and media-driven societies, which are especially evident in high modern societies. Stig Hjarvard has defined mediatization as “the process whereby society to an increasing degree is submitted to, or becomes dependent on, the media and their logic. This process is characterized by a duality in that the media have become integrated into the operations of social institutions (family, work, politics, etc.) while at the same time acquiring the status of a social institution in their own right.”²

Two objections, in particular, have been raised in connection with this new terminology and concept. The first is that this inquiry into the centrality of the media has been the focus of media research all along, which highlights that mediatization has a long history. We need to think about mediatization in similar ways as other long-term—but distinct—developments such as globalization. Neither one of these processes is historically speaking new, yet both of them have accelerated to such a degree that their effects have become ever more apparent and profound. As Friedrich Krotz pointed out, “Mediatization thus should be defined as a historical, ongoing, long-term development in which more and more media emerge and are institutionalized.” The transition from stone tablets to papyrus, the invention of the printing press or the emergence of the electronic media are all earlier parts of this historical process. For many media scholars, mediatization is a grand concept on par with others such as commercialization, individualization and globalization, and they believe that it will become just as broadly recognized and applied.³

The second objection has been raised primarily by British media scholars. Are the new terms, “mediatization” and “mediatized society,” really superior to the established concepts of “mediation” and “mediated society,” they ask? Mediatization scholars argue that the new terms are better suited to capture the broader processes implied in current media developments. Mediation, for example, is often used to describe direct, face-to-face communication or can be used to describe the relatively neutral process of relaying information. Utilizing the mediatization paradigm is better suited to analyze the increasingly complex and ubiquitous ways by which the media impact our lives. Gianpietro Mazzoleni put it most succinctly: “In brief, the concept of ‘mediatization of society’ indicates an extension of the influence of the media into all societal spheres.”⁴ Based on the thrust of current media research, it seems certain that the

concept of mediatization is here to stay. In fact, its usage is rapidly accelerating—in no small part driven by the dynamic expansion of the new media and their ever increasing applications. Whether we look at the development of online banking and online newspapers, the accelerating utilization of media and PR campaigns in politics or the transformation of personal communication, leisure and our work environments, we are all subject to the expanding dynamics of mediatization.

The goal of this article is to analyze the media coverage during wartime within the context of the mediatization paradigm. War and war reporting, like other sectors of our highly modern societies, have indeed become mediatized, and this history goes back a long way.⁵ In his study on war imagery, Gerhard Paul identified World War I as the first mediatized war. This war saw the development of large propaganda organizations in all combatant countries. Due to the vast expansion of newspapers and magazines as well as the development of film and radio broadcasting, government agencies were able to disseminate their propaganda swiftly and effectively. The professionalization of advertising and the strict censorship of news media were additional aspects of this initial mediatization of war.⁶ During World War II, these developments were further heightened and perfected. Hitler's use of propaganda and the media are well known. In the United States as well, news censorship flourished even as new information modes such as live overseas broadcasts became feasible. More often than not, American propaganda was privatized, carried out by commercial advertising and media professionals and seamlessly inserted into radio broadcasts, mainstream films and popular magazines.⁷

The Vietnam and Iraq Wars seem particularly well suited to analyze the accelerating impact of the media on wars, since each took place during the next two phases of the

mediatization process. In the 1950s and 1960s, television came of age in the western world, and Vietnam became the first televised war. Likewise, the Iraq War of 2003 was fought in the midst of the digital age, shaped by the novel reporting made possible through technological changes and the expansion of the new media. This article applies a historical and comparative approach in order to both trace these developments over time and to account for particularities in national patterns. Eric W. Rothenbuhler advocated that we study mediatization through “historical and comparative studies. ... How else could we know [that] it is the media and not something else that produced the historical change other than through comparative study?”⁸

The analysis of the media’s influence on wars and wartime reporting has become more urgent as the media have become ever more integral to the military strategy and the conduct of warfare. Central to my inquiry are the questions of how and to what degree media war reporting changed from the Vietnam to the Iraq War and what impact this had on reporters, combatants, and home audiences. Did military strategies change due to the enhanced media presence? How did the general public learn about these wars, and how did they respond to these strategies? Finally, has the relationship between the government, the military, and the media changed significantly?

This article argues that the mediatization of war significantly accelerated with the news coverage of the Vietnam War and reached unprecedented levels during the Iraq War of 2003. Therefore, just as media scholars have described the media as the “Fourth Estate” (next to the executive, legislative and judicial branches) in order to highlight its importance for the functioning of the political democratic system, what has emerged by the turn of the 21st century was the elevation of the media as the “Fourth Branch” of military operations (beyond the army,

air force and navy). The utilization of the media in all facets of military strategy and information operations has become an absolutely essential part of war in the 21st century, and the Iraq War has provided us with a glimpse into the future of mediatized warfare and war coverage.

Media Coverage of the Vietnam War in the United States and West Germany

Today we remember the Vietnam War as the first televised war. This is no doubt accurate, as long as we keep in mind that this is a more fitting description for the United States than other countries, including nations in Western Europe. By the late 1950s, television had already taken the United States by storm. When it came to news reporting, American television took a slight lead over newspapers as early as 1964. By 1972, 48 of Americans chose television as their favorite news medium while only 21 percent preferred newspapers.⁹

By comparison, the development of television as an entertainment and information medium was delayed by almost a decade in West Germany. In 1961, only one in four West German families owned a TV. By the late 1960s, roughly 75 percent of all homes were equipped with a television set, which is when TV news began to displace the radio and newspapers as the primary information media.¹⁰ Therefore, West Germans relied more heavily on the newspapers to learn about political news, especially during the first half of the Vietnam War. The other major difference between the United States and the Federal Republic was that America was a combatant while West Germany never sent any troops to Vietnam. Unsurprisingly, media scholars have found that the media of combatant countries are usually less critical and more supportive of wars than those of non-combatants.¹¹ What is rather astonishing in this context is

that the reporting on the Vietnam War in the United States was initially more critical than in West Germany. Why was this the case?

The short answer is that West Germany was more tightly bound by the Cold War ideology than any other West European nation. Located on the front lines of the battle against communism, West German politicians were keenly aware of the dangers of communist aggression. The containment of the communist foe had provided the unifying foundation for U.S.-West German relations since the end of World War II.¹² American and West German politicians ritualistically paid homage to this fact in the early 1960s. Shortly after taking office in 1963, for example, Lyndon B. Johnson affirmed the continuation of John F. Kennedy's vigorous anti-communist policies: "This nation will keep its promises from South Vietnam to West Berlin." Such messages were well received in the Federal Republic. For the majority of the West German population there was little doubt that the freedom of their country and the security of West Berlin were defended in the jungles of Indochina. This "nexus between South Vietnam and West Germany" was the bedrock of American-German relations in connection with Vietnam and was repeated by politicians and commentators across the political spectrum.¹³

When it came to reporting the early Vietnam War, American newspapers in the years from 1962 to 1965 were rather accurate. The leading American media reflected the tumultuous crises and far-reaching decisions which the United States government was deliberating at that time. While overall supportive of the U.S. government and military, they captured the ambiguous situation in 1964, which was shared by members of Congress and the American public. Yet few newspapers officially broke with the government policy like the *New York Times*, which as early as 1965 called for a negotiated settlement instead of increased escalation.¹⁴

West German newspapers viewed the war fairly consistently through the lens of the containment doctrine. Most prestigious newspapers also deployed the accompanying domino theory in a myriad of ways to support America's stance in Vietnam, repeatedly alluding to the threat of an aggressive communist China. As one journalist in the prominent *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* warned in March of 1964, "If Beijing is successful with its [expansionist] strategy in this part of the world, it will have a significant impact on the radical revolutionary movements especially in Asia, Africa and Latin America." Even more broadly was the endorsement of the influential weekly, *Die Zeit*, in 1965: "The containment of communism in Europe was the predominant task of the 1940s and 1950... The containment of China is the predominant task of the 1960s and 1970s."¹⁵

Television coverage was equally supportive of the war in both countries and often more closely tied to the Cold War consensus in the early stages of the war. The coverage often read like a morality play, pitting good, selfless Americans defending South Vietnamese and worldwide freedom against conniving, fanatical Vietcong fighters.¹⁶ The daily television news reports in West Germany were similarly biased towards the American "crusade for liberty." In hindsight, those in charge of the news reports at the time argue that this kind of reporting was typical of the early Vietnam War, when the Cold War rivalry and West Germany's tensions with its East European neighbors dominated foreign affairs and mainstream thinking.¹⁷

One exception to this conformist reporting style was in-depth political TV programs, which emerged slightly earlier in West Germany than in the United States. One of these specialty programs was *Weltspiegel (Mirror of the World)*, which premiered in 1963 as a half-hour news show. It focused exclusively on foreign affairs and quickly gained a reputation for quality

programming and garnered large audiences.¹⁸ Though its reports often viewed the Vietnam War through the lens of the accepted Cold War paradigm as well, some were quite remarkable for their critical tenor. One of these aired in March of 1966, tellingly entitled “The Hopeless War.” The opening segment set the tone: “The technical equipment, the firepower and thereby the might of the Americans was never more apparent than in the spring of 1966. Never was America further away from losing this war—and never further away from winning it.” The reporter predicted that the United States would have to send one million soldiers to Vietnam in order to effectively turn the tide of war and doubted that this was politically feasible.¹⁹ This was a remarkable piece of reporting both for its blunt assessment and its questioning analysis, especially in early 1966 when West German media were toeing the official government line.

By 1967, the Vietnam War had settled into its own increasingly predictable and savage routine. America and its allies pointed to their successes by having staved off the collapse of the South Vietnamese government and temporarily halting the advances of the National Liberation Front (NLF) and its North Vietnamese allies. Yet all of this had come at a high cost: by mid-1967, there were nearly 450,000 American troops in Vietnam, and the pacification measures and “search-and-destroy” missions were causing heavy casualties while the war effort was ravishing the U.S. treasury. And despite increasingly atrocious bombing campaigns against North Vietnam, the enemy was not buckling under the pressure, yet world opinion began to turn decisively against the United States.²⁰

Well before Walter Cronkite’s famous statement about an inevitable stalemate in Vietnam in early 1968, the conditions for such a stalemate were in place. By all accounts, the turning point of the Vietnam War was emerging in 1967 already. The Tet Offensive merely

functioned as a giant exclamation mark. The erosion of the support for the war was a confluence of three distinct yet related factors: “growing divisions in Washington, declining morale among American troops in the field, and the spread of the antiwar movement into parts of the political mainstream.” Television and the media followed and reflected this increasing trend, but did not lead it.²¹

The West German media assessed the situation in Vietnam between 1967 and 1969 in a very similar manner. Like the American media, its German counterpart vacillated between support and criticism, optimism and pessimism, while the skeptical voices were becoming markedly louder in 1967. Even papers that had staunchly supported the U.S. parted ways with the Johnson administration. By late 1967, articles highlighting the unimaginable magnitude of the bombings became increasingly prevalent. As they pointed out, the United States had already dropped at least five times as many bombs on North Vietnam as were dropped on Germany during all of World War II.²²

There is no doubt that the Tet Offensive of early 1968 produced some of the most dramatic television footage up to that point. Gripping pictures of U.S. soldiers under attack or injured made the news during the weeks after the initial attacks as well as harrowing video of the misery of the South Vietnamese population caught in the crossfire. The fighting was savage and, unlike the pictures of American bombing runs, highly personalized. Some of these images literally went around the world, and television commentators accompanied them with harsh criticisms of the Johnson administration. On February 1, 1968 in a commentary on ABC news, Joseph C. Harsch threw every public pronouncement in doubt: “What government officials say in private bears little resemblance to the highly orchestrated public good cheer.” The Tet

Offensive led to a new portrayal of the Vietnam War on American television. This “new image of the war” significantly scaled back the guts-and-glory reporting, references to World War II dropped off sharply and “our” war was now simply “the” war. The new consensus was no longer to win the war, but to get out of Vietnam by saving face—“peace with honor,” as the Nixon campaign would put it.²³

In the West German media, the Tet Offensive led to a similarly sharp reassessment. Footage from North Vietnam and the National Liberation Front appeared in the West German TV reporting in the late 1960s, and it shifted the viewpoint from treacherous Vietcong guerillas to the portrayal of brave patriots who withstood the withering attacks of an overpowering American goliath. This critical reporting, finally, was capped off by the first reports of the My Lai Massacre in 1969, which would dominate a good portion of the news coverage that year.²⁴

This evolution towards a more critical reporting in West Germany in the late 1960s was part of a veritable media revolution. As Christina von Hodenberg has demonstrated, the West German public sphere had undergone “a rapid politicization which was part of the ongoing socio-cultural democratization of the Federal Republic.” As younger, more engaged journalists were coming of age and were taking over the newsrooms in West Germany, the public tenor shifted rather swiftly from consensus to conflict. Critical reporting which challenged established mainstream views now became the new norm. The “consensus journalism” of the 1950s was swept out. A final sign of this novel news ethos and critical reporting was that the new generation of journalists actually welcomed the protests and rebellion, which they saw as part and parcel of a critical public sphere long overdue in West Germany.²⁵

The Mediatization of the Vietnam War

In August 1968, more than half of all Americans called the war a mistake, and by October 1969, a majority considered it morally indefensible. The news coverage of the U.S. media both reflected and accelerated this shift in public opinion but did not cause it. In West Germany, the Tet Offensive and the revelations of U.S. atrocities reported in 1969 caused a similar revision. Not only did the ideological differences of the West German media become more pronounced, but more journalists were moving towards critical or even outright oppositional reporting. In the influential weekly magazine *Der Spiegel*, for example, criticism and negative reporting focusing on U.S. militarism and deep societal flaws dominated the reporting on Vietnam between 1970 and 1972. A final trope of reporting, which gained more currency as the war continued, was the indirect blurring of Nazi war crimes and American atrocities. Reports of the use of chemical warfare by the United States, the bombing campaigns, and the mass killings of innocent civilians merged with the domestic discourse of Nazi crimes in West Germany.²⁶ Vietnam was increasingly viewed as an unjustifiable, immoral and reprehensible war.

This comparison between the media coverage in the two countries further calls into question the power of television reporting as a cause for the increasing opposition to the war. The impact of “the living room war” on the West German public was far more muted than that in the United States, and yet the opposition against the war increased just as much. This adds further credence to the argument that the TV coverage accelerated opposition to the war, yet it did not cause America’s military defeat.²⁷ In many ways, this accelerator effect of the media and television coverage was similar to other mediatized conflicts of the 1960s. As Todd Gitlin has

highlighted, the student movement was propelled towards ever more spectacular demonstrations, which ultimately led to the celebrity of the few at the cost of the organizational cohesion of the movement. Likewise, the Civil Rights Movement partially relied on the use of “dramaturgical” framing of their demonstrations, knowing full well that the racist outbursts against nonviolent protestors would be captured by cameramen and replayed on American television screens. In both of these cases, the media accelerated emerging developments but neither created them nor decided the final outcome.²⁸

Moreover, the television footage that Americans or Germans saw on Vietnam was neither live nor unedited. It took 30 hours for film reports from Vietnam to be shipped, edited and cleared for American TV screens. In his analysis of TV news programs between 1968 and 1973, Oscar Patterson found “little graphic coverage” in the TV daily reports. As he concluded, “a form of selective perception (and more importantly selective retention) on the part of the general public of certain highly dramatic events has led to the projection of those as characteristic of television coverage of the Vietnam war to a far greater extent than was actually true.”²⁹

One of the defining patterns of our mediatized societies might well be its ability to create a “new memory” of events through repeatedly replaying iconic images and film footage. For example, the majority of Americans believe that they witnessed the assassination of John F. Kennedy live on television in 1963, even though the Zapruder film was not available for viewing until five years after the event.³⁰ Something similar has happened in connection with the Vietnam War: iconic images, documentary footage and feature films have forever altered the memory of what was actually seen on television at the time. The “new memory” of the Vietnam War has effectively replaced the historical record.

Overall, the Vietnam War has rightly been viewed as a significant acceleration of the mediatization of war. But the media reporting did not determine the outcome of the war. Ironically, though, the lessons which military and political leaders in the United States and elsewhere applied in the next wars were to no small measure based on the historical fallacy of the media's decisive impact.

Interlude: The Gulf War of 1991 in the American and German Media

If Vietnam was the first televised war, the Gulf War of 1991 was the first live television war. There was only one problem: there was very little live TV coverage of actual fighting because reporters were effectively barred from the battlefield. In fact, the coverage of the Gulf War was almost devoid of any live objects: neither the American or Iraqi soldiers nor the Iraqi civilian population were depicted. It was, as many scholars have argued, primarily “a techno war,” “a virtual war” dominated by the prowess of military hardware. Footage of bombs illuminated the Baghdad night sky and precision smart bombs which hit their targets without fail—those were the images which dominated the live TV coverage during the few months of the Gulf War in the United States, Germany, and much of the rest of the world.³¹

It was a mediatized war controlled by the American military and U.S. media dominance. The leaders in the Pentagon and the White House had learned the alleged lessons of the Vietnam War: control the media coverage by denying reporters access to the theater of war. Instead, select groups of reporters were organized into pools and allowed access to sites in groups and accompanied by military guides. “Operation Desert Storm,” which was the code name for the

campaign turned into “Operation Desert Muzzle,” as John R. MacArthur has phrased it, where “the journalists in the Gulf were reduced to the level of stenographers.”³²

In Germany, the tenor of the media coverage sounded very similar. One steady criticism was that the German media, television in particular, had relied too much on the CNN version of the war. Many analysts and journalists alike argued that the war coverage was largely devoid of serious news content. The media coverage had all the elements of a “macabre video game,” they argued, which repeatedly showed successful smart bombs hitting their targets, yet shed no light on the collateral damage created by the vast majority of “un-smart” bombs.³³ Likewise, since the reporting was driven by commercial incentives, the dynamics of the coverage disintegrated into infotainment where the reality and brutality of war receded into the background.³⁴

The Gulf War of 1991 was the last war in which the military could effectively control the media and almost completely dominate the international coverage. In the media environment of the 21st century, this level of military censorship is no longer possible. In little more than ten years, mediatization took a quantum leap forward, largely due to the development of the internet and social media, new cell phone and satellite technology as well as the emergence of global rival news networks. As a result, mediatized war would never be the same.

Media Coverage of the Iraq War in Germany and the United States

Germany was one of many European countries that did not join the American-led “coalition of the willing” against Iraq in 2003. German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder expressed his opposition to the military invasion in the fall of 2002. His stance reflected the opinion of the

vast majority of Germans and significantly helped his re-election that year. However, Germany had consistently supported the other war at the time, the war in Afghanistan. This, in fact, highlighted the consistent policy of Germany as well as a significant number of European and NATO countries: support for the war in Afghanistan, yet opposition to the war in Iraq.³⁵

What did the media coverage of the Iraq War in Germany look like, then? To start with, all German TV channels covered the pre-war phase as well as the initial military campaigns in great detail. Especially the reporting of the opening phase of the war was similar to the coverage in the United States. German television stations highlighted the initial “shock and awe” campaign, and all of them had embedded reporters with coalition forces. What was apparent as well, however, was that German journalists did not want to repeat the mistakes of the first Gulf War when the war had been dominated by the “CNN show.”³⁶ The fact that Germany was not actively engaged in the Iraq War and that the majority of the German public opposed it encouraged journalists to put their principles into action.

One of the noticeable differences in the two countries was how little use German television stations made of reports from their embedded reporters. Only about 2-4 percent of all reports during the height of the fighting were based on embedded journalists. Considering how enticing it was to use this live footage, this percentage is very low indeed. This voluntary restraint was predicated on the skeptical assessment of this military news coverage. Most German media severely criticized this new strategy and predicted that it would lead to biased and one-sided reporting. This general suspicion was further supported by a widely reported incident when an embedded journalist for the German RTL TV channel slipped into a casual “we” while

reporting the advance of an American unit: “We have the most modern military equipment in the world.”³⁷

The second major distinction of the German TV coverage of the Iraq War was the purposefully broad and varied use of foreign media footage. Instead of relying solely on CNN or American footage, German TV stations drew from multiple foreign sources to present a more nuanced picture of the war: nearly 40% came from U.S. and British channels, slightly more than 40% originated from Arab news channels and about 15% of coverage relied on Iraqi sources. Small percentages also came from Iran, France and Turkey. Most surprising is the fact that the inclusion of American footage was slightly less frequent than news from Arab stations, mainly Al-Jazeera and Abu Dhabi TV. The most important factor driving this development was the deliberate decision by the German media not to overlook the civilian victims and the “collateral” damage, and Arab media were most inclined to highlight this aspect of the war.³⁸

The third factor which provided a constant check on German TV coverage was that print journalists were watching their television colleagues closely. While self-reflective news coverage of crisis situations was not new, the degree of public analysis reached unprecedented levels. In a four-month period in early 2003, for example, roughly 15% of all war-related articles discussed the nature of the reporting or highlighted limitations of the media coverage. The medium most criticized was television. The majority of these articles focused on German media (roughly 30 percent), approximately 20 percent of took aim at American reporting whereas 10-12 percent were directed against Arab news channels. The most common criticism was the partisan and one-sided reporting. While the broad-based denunciation of Iraqi news coverage was hardly surprising, the strong and near unanimous criticism of U.S. media in the German press was

noteworthy. The most frequent criticism was that American media rarely showed pictures of civilian casualties and employed significant self-censorship.³⁹

Particularly controversial was the handling of images of captured and dead U.S. soldiers compared with the footage of dead and mutilated Iraqi civilians. One such incidence occurred on March 23, 2003, when 29 U.S. soldiers were killed and six were captured. The footage of captured US prisoners and dead American soldiers was distributed by Al-Jazeera. All German TV stations broadcast parts of it, although usually only in the form of photographs. The appeal by Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, who requested that these images not be shown, was widely denounced as were most mainstream American media which went along with his request.⁴⁰

The coverage of the weekly magazine *Der Spiegel* provides a further case in point. The impact of the war on Iraqi citizens quickly became a major focal point in its war coverage. Even though the magazine held Saddam Hussein primarily responsible for the war and even described him as a “paranoid despot,” the arguments for the use of military force by the Bush administration were summarily rejected. What is significant as well was the magazine’s frontal assault on the American claim that the Iraq War was an integral part of the “War on Terror.” In a very similar vein, the use of spectacular, Hollywood-inspired footage like the rescue of Jessica Lynch remained continually suspect in the German media.⁴¹

Overall, this pronounced antiwar reporting in the German media during the Iraq War is highlighted in international comparisons as well. A study which compared the television news in the United States, the United Kingdom and Germany found that Germany’s television reports were the most critical in their coverage and focused most on casualties suffered by the Iraqi

population. In the United States, by contrast, the emphases were exactly reversed, with the vast majority of reports in support of the military campaigns while very little attention was being paid to Iraq civilian casualties. The BBC coverage held down the golden middle, with roughly equal coverage of these two topics.⁴²

While the German media as a whole thus reflected an oppositional reporting of the war, there is little doubt that the media in the United States were far too deferential to the Bush administration. The vaunted media watchdog, as most observers argued, had become the demure government lap dog. The one word most frequently cited to summarize the performance of the American media during the Iraq War, as even a cursory survey of book titles will attest, was “failure:” *When the Press Fails, The War in Iraq and Why the Media Failed Us, So Wrong For So Long*, and so forth.⁴³

The list of omissions is long indeed. Most important was the media’s failure to set the record straight in terms of Iraq’s lack of involvement with the 9/11 attacks. In October 2002, two-thirds of all Americans believed that Saddam Hussein had helped the terrorists carry out the attacks on 9/11, and roughly the same number of Americans believed that Iraq was close to developing nuclear weapons and possessed biological and chemical arsenals. After an aggressive communications strategy by the White House, 70% of Americans supported military action in January of 2003. In hindsight, several American media admitted their inadequate news coverage leading up to the war, which led to the unprecedented step of both the *New York Times* and the *Washington Post* publicly apologizing to their readers. Likewise, critics have rightly pointed out that the American media were far too deferential to U.S. political and military leaders.⁴⁴

While the soul-searching about the media's failure during the Iraq War will undoubtedly continue, a number of conclusions have already surfaced. The first of these confirms what media researchers have been saying for a while: when a country is determined to go to war, its media find it difficult—if not impossible—to resist the call to arms. “[Especially] once a war begins,” as William Dorman has pointed out, “critical thinking in any society, free or not, becomes virtually impossible.” Whether one calls it groupthink or the power of political and ideological consensus, the dynamics of these forces are hard to challenge.⁴⁵ A wide variety of factors have further increased this pervasive trend. The ratings war and shrinking newspaper readership have reduced the ability of journalists to challenge politicians on issues which enjoy wide popular support. In addition, the White House pursued an aggressive communications strategy which gradually built a solid consensus behind the war, and anyone who dared question the evidence was targeted, marginalized or ostracized. Lastly, in the aftermath of 9/11 the volatility of the country and the patriotism which permeated every aspect of the national culture played directly into the hands of war proponents and gave them additional leverage.⁴⁶

Finally, the American media system has always worked best within a functioning, oppositional political framework. As the reporting on the Vietnam War highlighted, the majority of the media shifted its reporting in tandem with the increasing opposition to the war. Not coincidentally, the “golden age of journalism” in the United States in the late 1960s and early 1970s was also a time period of deep disagreement about the political priorities of the nation, which provided cover for a more critical and oppositional media.⁴⁷

The Mediatization of the Iraq War

If so much stayed the same in connection with the American media coverage of the Iraq War, why should we consider it a new chapter in the mediatization of war? Part of the answer is that U.S. media coverage was not representational of the rest of the world. The irony of this was that the most advanced and technologically developed country actually saw one of the most traditional versions of this war. The tight domestic consensus led to a significant self-censorship by American reporters and editors and ultimately produced a rather one-dimensional view of the war. As the German case indicated, however, that was not what the rest of the world saw.

The Iraq War represents a new chapter in the mediatization of the war because the media indeed functioned increasingly as the fourth branch of military operations. The key components of this transformation are related to three overarching developments: the emergence of rival global news networks and the creation of an oppositional global public sphere; the professionalization of the military information strategies and warfare, which included the utilization of embedded reporters; and, finally, the emergence of the internet both as a medium for alternative news sources as well as an arena for expanded warfare in the form of cyberwar.

The first of these is one of the most discussed changes of the media war. The global news monopoly which CNN enjoyed in the early 1990s lasted only briefly. Since the mid-1990s a host of new global satellite news channels have emerged, and none has attracted more attention than the rise of Al-Jazeera. To many Western viewers Al-Jazeera is known primarily through its release of the Osama bin Laden tapes as well as its critical coverage of the Iraq War. Because of this oppositional reporting, the network quickly acquired the reputation of “Osama’s mouthpiece” or “Taliban TV” in the United States especially. During the Iraq War, Rumsfeld

dismissed it as “Jihad-TV.” These characterizations highlight the degree of frustration on the part of political opponents and indicate the significant cross-currents which Al-Jazeera created.⁴⁸

Despite the ongoing controversy over the reporting by Al-Jazeera, the vast majority of observers point out that the new Arab channel is a reputable news source. By the time of the Iraq War, 35 million households in the Arab world watched it on a regular basis, and it emerged as a provider of news for Western networks as well. In addition, Al-Jazeera has rightly been called “an equal opportunity offender.” In a region where most news outlets are controlled by political leaders and governments, Al-Jazeera has been roundly criticized and frequently censored by Arab governments for its critical style of reporting.⁴⁹

In the case of the Iraq War, Al-Jazeera’s focus was on the impact of the war on the Iraqi civilian population. Its images of the wounded and dead made the rounds through Arab as well as western countries. The decision to release often graphic images was partly driven by the Arab media environment, where Al-Jazeera was competing with Al-Arabiya and Abu Dhabi television. However, it was also fueled by sense of hypocrisy, since Western media were often squeamish about showing the dead soldiers of coalition forces, yet showed no such scruples when it came to displaying Iraqi dead and wounded. Adel Iskandar and Mohammed el-Nawary have described the reporting style of Al-Jazeera as “contextualized objectivity.” By this they mean that the network strives for fair and balanced reporting, yet like all other global news channels is inextricably linked to the dominant political perspectives of its viewers and driven by competitive market forces within its region.⁵⁰

The new global media rivalry has forever changed how future wars will be covered. As the American and Western media dominance recedes, competing rival networks are emerging all

around the globe. The “post-American world,” a term which Fareed Zakaria uses to discuss the relative decline of American political influence as new economic and political powers emerge, is reflected in the global shift of war coverage as well. It is bound to remain an integral aspect and ongoing flashpoint of 21st-century mediatized war.⁵¹

Second, many observers have pointed to the enhanced professionalization of the media management before and during recent wars. The reason for this accelerated trend is that no government or military, not even the Pentagon, can any longer control the visual imagery of war. The best governments can hope for is to shape global and domestic public opinion in their favor by dominating the war coverage with favorable footage. The new wartime trend is towards “information warfare,” which includes both “informational operations” and “perception management.” The ultimate goal is to dominate the communications networks and to utilize the media to one’s own advantage.⁵²

In connection with the Iraq War, the core issue which has emerged as one of the main media controversy was the Pentagon strategy of embedding reporters with coalition troops. While not entirely new, this integration of journalists with army units was planned far ahead and reflected the realization on the part of the U.S. Defense Department that it would not be able to recreate the pool system of the first Gulf War. The military planners took their chances hoping that the embedding of reporters would provide a steady stream of riveting, positive images of the military campaign. As most observers agree, the strategy proved successful. When it came to feeding the unrelenting 24-hour news media cycle, the strategy of embedding journalists satisfied this media appetite and proved effective in delivering popular footage. Yet it also created a partial illusion of war and narrowly focused reports which lacked both context and analysis.⁵³

The third major shift in the nature of mediatized war is the development and increasing significance of the Internet and the social media. To start with, as Philip Seib argues, “Cyber warfare is not science fiction; the first attacks have already occurred.” While there is no evidence of government involvement in any of the cyber attacks during the Iraq War, both high-profile Arab as well as U.S. government web sites came under attack as did web sites of Islamist and antiwar organizations. It is easy to imagine that we have just seen the beginnings of the usage of cyber warfare by both private parties and governmental agencies.⁵⁴

In addition, warblogs became widespread through the Iraq War because they brought readers close to the action. Unlike embedded reporters, they had the advantage of providing alternative news sources. The most famous warblog of the Iraq War was written by a twenty-nine-year-old Iraqi architect, who reported under the pseudonym Salam Pax. During early part of the war, the site attracted over 100,000 visitors per day. Such blogs created a heavy dose of verisimilitude and readers quite literally felt that they were closer to the action. The same is true for the many warblogs written by soldiers, which began to appear in ever greater number. In addition, the Internet also served as an organizing tool for grassroots journalists and antiwar activists by creating websites which challenged the official version of the war.⁵⁵

There certainly are additional aspects which could be added here which are an integral part of the enhanced mediatization of 21st-century warfare. The increased targeting of specific reporters and news channels; the accelerating speed and immediacy of television reporting in the competitive 24-hour news cycle; the greatly expanded self-reflexivity of the media (media monitoring and patrolling themselves); the expansion of social media as well as the noticeable focus on the visual imagery of the Gulf and Iraq Wars—all of these point in the same direction.

Together with the three broad transformations discussed earlier, they highlight that we have indeed entered a new stage of mediatized war. As the *New York Times* commented, we have seen “the first real war of the Information Age.”⁵⁶ While some of these developments, especially the impact of the internet, are still in the early stages, it has provided us with a glimpse into the nature of future mediatized warfare.

Conclusion

Mediatization is an ongoing historical development and accelerating process which is reshaping our society, politics and everyday lives by making the media ever more powerful and integral. Wars have become increasingly mediatized as a part of this dynamic. This has significantly altered many aspects of military strategy and warfare as both the media coverage of the Vietnam and Iraq Wars demonstrate.

This article has analyzed the accelerated mediatization of war over the past fifty years. The focus was on a comparative view of the media coverage of the Vietnam and Iraq Wars in the United States and Germany. The purpose of this historical and comparative approach was to identify some of the patterns of the mediatization of war while simultaneously recognizing particular national characteristics. As this study shows, the developments are neither uniform nor unidirectional, depending on the cultural and historical circumstances.

What does all of this mean for the future relationship between the media, the public and governments before and during wartime? We can draw some significant parallels between the mediatization of war and the mediatization of politics here. In their research, Gianpietro

Mazzoleni and Winfried Schulz summed up the relationship between media and politics in the following manner: “The best description of the current situation is ‘mediatization,’ where political institutions increasingly are dependent on and shaped by the mass media but nevertheless remain in control of political processes and functions.”⁵⁷

This squares closely with the findings of my study. Even during the Iraq War, as the global media landscape became more competitive and divisive, most national media reflected the political consensus within their countries. A comparative study of television coverage in Australia, the United States, the United Kingdom and India has demonstrated that more than 75 percent of reports in these respective countries stayed within the national consensus while only about 20 percent were critical or oppositional to dominant political and public sentiments. Denis McQuail comes to a similar assessment. The mediatization of war has made the information strategies and control ever more imperative and difficult for governments, but he tempers this by concluding: “Perhaps most important is still the fact that the mainstream media do not on the whole represent any real threat to governments that can plausibly claim to be acting in the national interest and with public support.”⁵⁸

The utilization of the media has indeed accelerated over the past fifty years. The mediatization of Vietnam War has found expression in the phrases “the first television war” or “living room war.” During the Iraq War, the rise of new global media networks, the enhanced information warfare and the expansion of the internet have further advanced the integration of the media into the military strategy of warfare. Some are suggesting that we capture this new stage of mediatization with terms like “the first digital network war” or “the first war of the Information Age.” All of this implies significant and important developments which need further

investigation. Yet it also leaves us with the important reminder that neither the media nor the dynamic forces of mediatization will be sufficient to prevent the next war of choice.

Endnotes

¹ I would like to thank a number of friends and colleagues who provided very helpful feedback on this article: Joel Davis, Dick Hill, Christina von Hodenberg, Mark Ruff, Mike Thomas and Chris Vaughn. I'm also grateful for the suggestions by the anonymous reviewers as well as the editor of the journal, Barbara Friedman. Finally, Concordia University Portland provided me with two consecutive summer research grants which allowed me to research and write this article.

² Stig Hjarvard, "Soft Individualism: Media and the Changing Social Character," in Knut Lundby, ed., *Mediatization: Concept, Changes, Consequences* (New York and Frankfurt a. M.: Peter Lang Publishing, 2009), 160. This anthology of essays is one of the best resources for understanding the concept of mediatization.

³ Friedrich Krotz, "Mediatization: A Concept With Which to Grasp Media and Societal Change," in Lundby, ed., *Mediatization*, 24-25. See also Krotz, *Mediatisierung: Fallstudien zum Wandel von Kommunikation* (Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 2007).

⁴ Nick Couldry, "Mediatization or Mediation? Alternative Understandings of the Emergent Space of Digital Storytelling," *New Media Society* 10, no. 3 (Fall 2008): 373-391; Mazzoleni is cited in the article by Jesper Strömbäck and Frank Esser, "Shaping Politics: Mediatization and Media Interventionism," in Lundby, ed., *Mediatization*, 208.

⁵ For excellent overviews, see Phillip Knightley, *The First Casualty: The War Correspondent as Hero and Myth-Maker from the Crimea to Iraq* (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2004); Susan L. Carruthers, *The Media at War: Communication and Conflict in the Twentieth Century* (London: Macmillan Press, 2000); and Ute Daniel, *Augenzeugen: Kriegsberichterstattung vom 18. zum 21. Jahrhundert* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2006).

⁶ Gerhard Paul, "Der Erste Weltkrieg," in *Bilder des Krieges—Krieg der Bilder. Die Visualisierung des modernen Krieges* (München: Wilhelm Fink Verlag, 2004), 103-172. See also the schematic overview of the history of war reporting listed in Thomas Dominikowski's essay, "Massenmedien und Massenkrieg: Historische Annäherungen an eine unfriedliche Symbiose," in Martin Löffelholz, ed., *Krieg als Medienereignis II: Krisenkommunikation im 21. Jahrhundert* (Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 2004), 61.

⁷ For the American side, see among others, Gerd Horten, *Radio Goes to War: The Cultural Politics of Propaganda during World War II* (Berkeley, Los Angeles and London: University of California Press, 2002); Clayton Koppes and Gregory Black, *Hollywood Goes to War: How Politics, Profits and Propaganda Shaped World War II Movies* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1990) and George H. Roeder, *The Censored War: American Visual Experience During World War II* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1993).

⁸ Eric W. Rothenbuhler, "Continuities: Communicative Form and Institutionalization," in Lundby, ed., *Mediatization*, 281.

⁹ J. Fred McDonald, *One Nation Under Television: The Rise and Decline of Network TV* (Chicago: Nelson Hall Publishers, 1994), 59 and 147. McDonald points out that in 1952 roughly a third of all American households owned a television set; the percentage of TV households swelled to roughly 55 percent by 1955 and had reached 85 percent by the end of that decade. On media news, see Daniel Hallin, *The „Uncensored War“: The Media and Vietnam* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989), 106.

¹⁰ Axel Schildt, „Materieller Wohlstand—pragmatische Politik—kulturelle Umbrüche. Die 60er Jahre in der Bundesrepublik,“ in Axel Schildt, Detlef Siegfried and Karl Christian Lammers, eds., *Dynamische Zeiten: Die 60er Jahre in den beiden deutschen Gesellschaften* (Hamburg: Hans Christians Verlag, 2000), 31. In West Germany, three public broadcasting channels controlled the network schedule: two nationally competing stations and local channels which serviced designated regions.

¹¹ See, for example, Martin Löffelholz, „Krisen- und Kriegskommunikation als Forschungsfeld: Trends, Themen und Theorien eines hoch relevanten, aber gering systematisierten Teilgebietes der Kommunikationswissenschaft,“ in Idem, ed., *Krieg als Medienereignis II*, 34-36.

¹² Alexander Troche, *„Berlin Wird am Mekong Verteidigt:“ Die Ostasienpolitik der Bundesrepublik in China, Taiwan und Süd-Vietnam, 1954-1966* (Düsseldorf: Dorste Verlag, 2001) and Joachim Arendt, *Johnson, Vietnam, und der Westen: Transatlantische Beziehungen, 1963-1969* (München: Olzog Verlag, 1994), 273-277.

¹³ For Johnson’s speech, see Arendt, *Johnson, Vietnam, und der Westen*, cover insert. Winfried Scharlau, “Vietnam in der deutschen Presse,“ in J. William Fulbright, ed., *Das Pentagon Informiert oder Der Propaganda-Apparat einer Weltmacht* (Hamburg: Rowohlt Taschenbuch Verlag, 1971), 20; and Troche, *„Berlin Wird am Mekong Verteidigt,“* 327-28. One of the few dissenting voices came from the editor of the influential weekly *Der Spiegel*. In an editorial on December 1965, Rudolf Augstein questioned the nexus approach to Vietnam by asserting that West Germans had never expected the United States to defend their country or West Berlin „in case of a civil war which unfolded internally. See Scharlau, “Vietnam in der deutschen Presse,“ in Fulbright, ed., *Das Pentagon Informiert*, 21.

¹⁴ Hallin, *Uncensored War*, 61 and William M. Hammond, *Reporting Vietnam: Media & Military at War* (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 1998), 34-35.

¹⁵ Scharlau, “Vietnam in der deutschen Presse,“ in Fulbright, ed., *Das Pentagon Informiert*, 14-18.

¹⁶ Hammond, *Reporting Vietnam*, 75 and Chester J. Pach, Jr., “Tet on Television,“ in Caroline Fink, Philipp Gassert and Detlef Junker, eds., *1968: The World Transformed*, (Washington, D.C.: German Historical Institute and Cambridge University Press, 1998), 58-59.

¹⁷ Winfried Scharlau, “Kriegsberichterstattung am Beispiel des Vietnamkrieges,“ *Rundfunk und Fernsehen* 39, no.2 (Summer 1991): 268-269.

¹⁸ See “Jubiläum: Der Weltspiegel wird 25,“ *ARD Magazin* (March and April 1988): 4-11.

¹⁹ *Weltspiegel*, March 11, 1966; Location 7172, Period from June 3, 1966 to May 6, 1966. Historical Archive of the West German Broadcasting Station (Westdeutscher Rundfunk—WDR), Cologne.

²⁰ Mark Atwood Lawrence, “Escalation” and “War on Many Fronts,“ in *The Vietnam War: A Concise International History* (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 67-114.

²¹ Hallin, *Uncensored War*, 162-163.

²² For an influential weekly journal which had strongly supported the war but shifted its approach, see, for example, Joachim Schwelien „Bomben neben dem Ziel,“ *Die Zeit*, November 24, 1967, ZASS II, Countries 152, U.S.A 1965-1973; Archiv der sozialen Demokratie der Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, Bonn (hereafter AdsD Archive). This trend was even more noticeable in more left-leaning magazines like the weekly *Der Spiegel*. Overall, the magazine followed a pro-U.S. approach in its war reporting up until 1966. Yet in 1967, the editorial staff underwent a change of heart. While some articles still expressed support for the United States, it gradually shifted its editorial policy towards a condemnation of America’s war policies. See Anita Eichholz, *Der Vietnamkrieg im Spiegel: Eine inhaltsanalytische Untersuchung* (Berlin: Verlag Volker Spiess, 1979), 178-182.

²³ Pach, Jr., “Tet on Television,“ 64-70, the quotations are on pages 69-70; and Hallin, *Uncensored War*, 174-180.

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- ²⁴ Editorial, „Tödliche Rettung,“ *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, February 10, 1968 and Lothar Rühl, „Die US-Truppen in bedrohlicher Lage,“ *Die Welt*, February 24, 1968; ZASS II, Länder 156, Vietnam 1968-1972; both in AdsD Archive.
- ²⁵ Christina von Hodenberg, „Mass Media and the Generation of Conflict: West Germany’s Long Sixties and the Formation of a Critical Public Sphere,“ *Contemporary European History* 15, no. 3 (Fall 2006): 367-395; the quotes are on pages 367 and 378.
- ²⁶ Hammond, *Reporting Vietnam*, 138 and 175; and Eichholz, *Vietnamkrieg*, 78-86 and 164-169.
- ²⁷ Hammond, *Reporting Vietnam*, 295-296; and Hallin, *Uncensored War*, 6-7.
- ²⁸ Todd Gitlin, Introduction and „Certifying Leaders and Converting Leadership to Celebrity,“ in *The Whole World Is Watching: Mass Media in the Making and Unmaking of the New Left* (Berkeley, Los Angeles and London: University of California Press, 2003), 1-20 and 146-179; and Doug McAdam, „Movement Strategy and Dramaturgic Framing in Democratic States: The Case of the American Civil Rights Movement,“ in Simone Chambers and Anne Constatin, eds., *Deliberation, Democracy and the Media* (Oxford: Rowman and Littlefield, 2000), 117-134. Both of these studies are discussed by Simon Cottle, „Reporting Demonstrations and Protests: Public Sphere(s), Public Screens,“ in *Mediatized Conflict* (London: Open University Press, 2006), 33-53.
- ²⁹ Oscar Patterson III, „An Analysis of Television Coverage of the Vietnam War,“ *Journal of Broadcasting* 28, no. 4 (Fall 1984): 401 and 403.
- ³⁰ Andrew Hoskins, *Televising War: From Vietnam to Iraq* (London: Continuum, 2004), 5-7; see also Paul, „Der Vietnam-Krieg,“ in *Bilder des Krieges*, 311-364.
- ³¹ John R. MacArthur, *Second Front: Censorship and Propaganda in the Gulf War* (Berkeley, Los Angeles and London: University of California Press, 1993); Bruce Cumings, *War and Television* (London: Verso Press, 1994); Paul Virilio, *Desert Screen: War at the Speed of Light* (London and New York: Continuum Publishing, 2002); Paul, „Der Golf-Krieg,“ in *Bilder des Krieges—Krieg der Bilder*, 365-406; and Susan Jeffords and Lauren Rabinovitz, eds., *Seeing through the Media: The Persian Gulf War* (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1994).
- ³² MacArthur, „Operation Desert Muzzle,“ in *Second Front*, 146-198. In his testimony before a Senate committee which investigated the complaints by the American media, Barry Zorthian, who was the spokesman for the US Mission in Saigon during the Vietnam War, was equally critical of this misguided application of the supposed lesson from the previous war: „The lesson of Vietnam [...] is a critical need for accurate and credible coverage by both the government and media which together present a complete picture for the public.“ Zorthian’s quote is on page 194.
- ³³ Christian Hörburger, „Kriegsbilder oder Wandel des Entsetzlichen,“ in Christian Büttner, Joachim von Gottberg and Verena Metze-Mangold, eds., *Der Krieg in den Medien* (Frankfurt and New York: Campus Verlag, 2004), 32-33.
- ³⁴ Martin Löffelholz, „Beschleunigung, Fiktionalisierung, Entertainisierung: Krisen (in) der Informationsgesellschaft,“ in Idem, ed., *Krieg als Medienereignis*, 49-64. This is not to say that the German public was opposed to the Gulf War, however. Quite to the contrary: unlike the Iraq War, the Gulf War found broad support among German politicians and the public alike. Despite sizable anti-war demonstrations in Germany at the time, most major mainstream media supported a forceful removal of Iraqi troops.
- ³⁵ Christian Müller, „Demokratie, die Medien und der Irakkrieg,“ in Büttner, von Gottberg and Metze-Mangold, eds., *Der Krieg in den Medien*, 13-21.
- ³⁶ Udo Michael Krüger, „Der Irak-Krieg im deutschen Fernsehen,“ *Media Perspektiven* 9, (September 2003): 401-403 and Hörburger, „Kriegsbilder oder Wandel des Entsetzlichen,“ in Büttner, von Gottberg and Metze-Mangold, eds., *Der Krieg in den Medien*, 32-35.
- ³⁷ Krüger, „Der Irak-Krieg im deutschen Fernsehen,“ 411-412 and Michael Beuthner und Stephan Alexander Weichert, „The More You Watch, the Less You Know‘: Hybridisierungstendenzen in der visuellen Kriegs- und Krisenkommunikation,“ in Thomas Knieper und Marion G. Müller, eds., *War Visions: Bildkommunikation und Krieg*

(Köln: Herbert von Halem Verlag, 2005), 156. In general, commercial stations in West Germany presented a more coalition-friendly coverage of the war than the public broadcasting stations and were frequently criticized for their heavy emphasis on the wonders of modern technology and equipment used by the American military.

³⁸ Krüger, „Der Irak-Krieg im deutschen Fernsehen,“ 403-405.

³⁹ Christiane Eilders, „Medien im Irakkrieg: Leistungen und Grenzen der Selbstreflektion,“ in Ralph Weiss, ed., *Zur Kritik der Medienkritik: Wie die Zeitungen das Fernsehen beobachteten* (Berlin: Schriftenreihe der Landesanstalt für Medien NRW, 2005), 281-336.

⁴⁰ Hans-Jürgen Weiss und Ansgar Koch, „Wie Kriegereignisse zu Medienereignissen werden. Die Ausstrahlung von Bildern gefangener und getöteter US-Soldaten im deutschen Fernsehen am 23. März 2003,“ in Knieper und Müller, eds., *War Visions*, 303-309.

⁴¹ Bernadette Kneidinger, *Der Golfkrieg in den Medien: Ein Vergleich der Berichterstattung in den Nachrichtenmagazinen ‚Der Spiegel‘ und ‚Profil‘* (Marburg: Tectum Verlag, 2005) and Eilders, „Medien im Irakkrieg,“ in Weiss, ed., *Zur Kritik der Medienkritik*, 325-327.

⁴² Raimund Mock and Markus Rettich, „The War Against Iraq on Television: A Split Reality,“ in Danny Schechter, ed., *Embedded: Weapons of Mass Deception. How the Media Failed to Cover the War in Iraq* (New York: Prometheus Books, 2003), 267-277. For a discussion of this study see also Howard Tumber and Jerry Palmer, *Media at War: The Iraqi Crisis* (London, Thousand Oaks and New Delhi: Sage Publications, 2004), 96-97.

⁴³ W. Lance Bennett, Regina G. Lawrence, and Steven Livingston, *When the Press Fails: Political Power and the News Media From Iraq to Katrina* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2007); David Dudge, *The War in Iraq and Why the Media Failed Us* (Westport and London: Praeger Press, 2006) and Greg Mitchell, ed., *So Wrong For So Long: How the Press, the Pundits—and the President—Failed on Iraq* (New York: Union Square Press, 2008).

⁴⁴ Dudge, *The War in Iraq*, 2 and 56. See also Tumber and Palmer, eds., *Media at War* and Bill Katovsky and Timothy Carlson, *Embedded: The Media at War in Iraq. An Oral History* (Guilford: The Lyons Press, 2003).

⁴⁵ William A. Dorman, „A Debate Delayed is a Debate Denied: U.S. News Media before the 2003 War with Iraq,“ in Alexander G. Nikolaev and Ernest A. Hakanen, eds., *Leading to the 2003 Iraq War: The Global Media Debate* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 11. Nick Couldry and John Downey make a similar point in their article „War or Peace? Legitimation, Dissent, and Rhetorical Closure in Press Coverage of the Iraq War Build-Up,“ in Allan and Zelizer, eds., *Reporting War*, 266-282.

⁴⁶ Piers Robinson, „Researching U.S. Media-State Relations in the Twenty-First Century Wars,“ in Allan and Zelizer, eds., *Reporting War*, 97-98. See also Robert McChesney, *The Problem of the Media: U.S. Communications Politics in the 21st Century* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 2004).

⁴⁷ Bennett, Lawrence and Livingston, „The Semi-Independent Press,“ in *When the Press Fails*, 46-71.

⁴⁸ For an overview and history of Al-Jazeera, see Mohammed El-Nawawy and Adel Iskandar, *Al-Jazeera: The Story of the Network That is Rattling Governments and Redefining Modern Journalism* (Cambridge, MA: Westview Press, 2003). For other perspectives on Al-Jazeera, see Catherine Cassara and Laura Lengel, „Move Over CNN: Al-Jazeera’s View of the World Takes on the West“ in Ralph D. Berenger, ed., *Global Media Go to War: Role of News and Entertainment Media During the 2003 Iraq War*, 232-233; and Benedikt Strunz and Ingeborg Villinger, „Heckenschütze im Informationskrieg? Zur Rolle Al-Jazeeras im Irakkrieg von 2003,“ in Barbara Korte and Horst Tonn, eds., *Kriegskorrespondenten: Deutungsinstanzen in der Mediengesellschaft* (Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften), 155-180.

⁴⁹ Stephen Quinn and Tim Walters, „Al-Jazeera: A Broadcaster Creating Ripples in a Stagnant Pool,“ in Berenger, ed., *Global Media Go to War*, 57-71; the quote is on page 58.

⁵⁰ Adel Iskandar and Mohammed el-Nawary, „Al-Jazeera and War Coverage in Iraq: The Media’s Quest for Contextual Objectivity,“ in Allan and Zelizer, eds., *Reporting War*, 315-332.

⁵¹ Fareed Zakaria, *The Post-American World* (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2008). Closely related to this, see Jeremy Tunstall, *The Media Were American: U.S. Mass Media in Decline* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008).

⁵² Walter Jertz und Carsten Bockstette, "Strategisches Informationsmanagement: Informations- und Öffentlichkeitsarbeit aus militärischer Perspektive" and Carsten Schlüter, „Information Operations: Die Weiterentwicklung US-militärischer Strategien zur Instrumentalisierung der Medien,“ in Löffelholz, ed., *Krieg als Medienereignis II*, 215-237 and 239-254.

⁵³ Philip Seib, *Beyond the Front Lines: How the News Media Cover a World Shaped by War* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), Preface and Stephen Hess and Marvin Kalb, eds., *The Media and the War on Terrorism* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2003), Introduction. See also Sorana Scholtes, *Der Krieg und die Medien: Die Berichterstattung über den Irakkrieg 2003* (Berlin: VDM Verlag Dr. Müller, 2007), 53-70 and Howard Tumber, "Prisoners of News Values: Journalists, Professionalism and Identification in Times of War," in Allan and Zelizer, eds., *Reporting War*, 190-205.

⁵⁴ Seib, "Cybernews, Cyberwar: The Internet as Tool and Battleground," in *Beyond the Front Lines*, 87-104 and Naila Hamdy and Rawda Mobarak, "Iraq War Ushers in Web-Based Era," in Berenger, ed., *Global Media Go to War*, 251-252.

⁵⁵ See Barbara K. Kaye and Thomas J. Johnson, "Weblogs as a Source of Information about the 2003 Iraq War," in Berenger, ed., *Global Media Go to War*, 291-301 and Patricia Aufderheide, "Big Media and Little Media: The Journalistic Informal Sector During the Invasion of Iraq," in Allan and Zelizer, eds., *Reporting War*, 333-346.

⁵⁶ Gerhard Paul, "Der 'Pictorial Turn' des Krieges: Zur Rolle der Bilder im Golfkrieg von 1991 und im Irakkrieg von 2003," in Korte und Tonn, eds., *Kriegskorrespondenten*, 113-136. See also Hans-Jürgen Bucher, „Internet und Krieg: Informationsrisiken und Aufmerksamkeitökonomie in der vernetzten Kriegskommunikation,“ in Löffelholz, ed., *Krieg als Medienereignis II*, 276; the quote from the *New York Times* is on page 275.

⁵⁷ Gianpietro Mazzoleni and Winfried Schulz, "Mediatization of Politics: A Challenge for Democracy?" *Political Communication* 16, no. 3 (1999): 247-261.

⁵⁸ Simon Cottle, "Mediatizing the Global War on Terror: Television's Public Eye," in Anandam P. Kavoori and Todd Fraley, eds., *Media, Terrorism and Theory: A Reader* (Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield, 2006), 35-37; and Denis McQuail, "On the Mediatization of War: A Review Article," *The International Communications Gazette* 68, no. 2 (2006): 116.